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Abstract 
Purpose: this study aims to identify the responses required to repair political trust in Tunisia and the 
differences between two key stakeholder groups, namely politicians and voters.  
Design/methodology/approach: A qualitative longitudinal study was adopted using two data sources: 
media data from TV political talk shows; and semi-structured interviews conducted with citizens and 
politicians. Data was collected following several key events that violated trust. 
Findings: New responses were identified to repair political trust and these were categorized using a 
trust repair framework.  In addition to short and long-term responses a new category, swift response, 
was identified to resolve immediate political uncertainty. The role of the trustor (i.e. voters) in actively 
restoring trust was identified for the first time.   
Research limitations: This study focused on trust repair responses suggested by voters and politicians 
and not responses that were implemented by the government or political parties during the period of 
study. The effectiveness of the suggested responses in repairing trust was not therefore evaluated.  
Practical implications: Identification of the responses required to repair trust with voters and how 
these differ over time and according to different trust violations will help Tunisian politicians rebuild 
trust more effectively during election and non-election periods. Notably, differences highlighted 
between the responses suggested by voters and politicians suggest that politicians may not understand 
how to repair voter trust.  
Originality/value: Contrary to previous studies that assume a trustor (the voter) is a passive observer, 
this research identified the proactive role that citizens play in the trust repair process.  
Keywords: trust repair, political marketing, media data, interviews, Tunisia, longitudinal study. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the recent past, surveys have repeatedly reported society’s trust in government and political systems 
at an all-time low. The most recent, the Edelman Trust Barometer (Edelman, 2020), positions 
government at the lowest level of trust for all institutions in terms of ethics and competence. Political 
trust is however critical in influencing electoral attitude and voters’ behaviour (Hetherington, 1999). 
Voters have changed over the years, becoming more cynical (Ahmed et al., 2011), more volatile and 
more skeptical about politicians who rarely keep their promises (Klabi, 2012).  Several authors have 
examined the antecedent of trust in an attempt to understand the relatively low levels of political trust 
among citizens (Chanley, 2002; Torcal, 2014.). Nevertheless, despite the large number of studies 
explaining what causes low levels of political trust, few have investigated how that lost trust can be 
repaired (Peng et al., 2016). Those that have examined trust repair have tended to focus on the image 
repair of political leaders after a crisis (Benoit and Henson, 2009; Garcia, 2011) and have largely been 
conducted in developed countries. The question that then arises is what responses can repair voter trust 
in an emerging country such as Tunisia. In answering this question, this study responds to several calls. 
First, Bozic (2017) highlighted the need to identify trust repair responses beyond apology and denial 
(which are also prominent in political trust repair studies) and to consider the needs of different 
stakeholders. Indeed, Bachmann et al. (2015) also observed that no single mechanism can be relied on 
to rebuild trust and suggested six potential trust repair mechanisms. We address these calls by 
uncovering an array of trust repair responses from two key stakeholder groups: voters and politicians. 
Second, Bachman et al. (2015) called for further research to investigate the extent to which trust repair 
is context bound. We address this by locating our study in an emerging but democratic country – 
Tunisia.  Bachmann et al. (2015) also called for longitudinal studies that examine how the need for 
trust repair changes over time. Our study covers a three-year period (2013 to 2015) and explores how 
the suggested trust repair strategies change after several political events that had a major impact on 
Tunisia.    
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
The ease with which trust can be destroyed compared to the difficulty in repairing it is well recognized 
(Kim et al., 2004). Given that trust can be destroyed so quickly, it is important to identify the strategies 
or responses1 to restore trust when a violation occurs. In this section we will define the concepts central 
to this study, i.e., trust, trust erosion and trust repair. We then move on to identify the different 
responses available to organizations to repair trust and identify the trust repair framework used to 
underpin this study.  
 
Trust and trust erosion 
Trust is an abstract and complex concept (Bozic, 2017; Rousseau et al., 1998) and as a consequence, 
various definitions exist. Rousseau et al. (1998) defined trust as a psychological state, a willingness to 
be vulnerable due to the positive expectations we have of another. Mayer et al.(1995) echoed this 
inclination to be vulnerable regardless of the ability to monitor or control the other party and Schurr & 
Ozanne (1985) defined trust as a belief in the words or promises of another party.  Central to these 
definitions is an individual (the trustor) that is willing to place themselves in a position of vulnerability 
due to a belief in another party (the trustee). Dependency is implied due to an inability of the trustor 
to verify the words or promises of the trustee (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
 
According to Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000), trust is eroded when the trustee fails to meet the trustor’s 
expectations. As a result, there is a reduction in the perception of the trustee and the trustor may no 
longer be willing to be vulnerable (Dietz and Gillespie, 2012). A trust violation can be the result of a 
specific event or on-going, repeated transgressions. The violations can be intentional or unintentional 
and may be due to incompetence or a failure in integrity. The nature of the transgression will affect 
the extent of trust erosion.    
 
1 These two terms are used interchangeably in the literature, for clarity, we will use the term “responses” in this paper. 
Trust repair  
Nakyachi and Watabe (2005) defined trust repair as the process of repairing and enhancing the 
perception of a trustee’s trustworthiness. According to Dirks et al. (2011:4), repairing trust “involves 
attempting to increase trust following a situation in which a transgression (i.e., untrustworthy 
behaviour) is perceived to have occurred.” Consequently, in contrast to building trust ‘from scratch’, 
repairing trust has to overcome negative expectations from the transgression. Trust and trust repair are 
therefore conceptually different.  
 
Consumer trust within the political domain has repeatedly been identified as low (Edleman, 2020), 
consequently there have been calls for studies to investigate trust repair in this context (Kim and Kim, 
2007). Extant studies have investigated the reasons behind the loss of trust towards the government, 
but studies examining trust repair are relatively few and the majority have focused on specific trust 
repair responses  (Boursin, 1999; West, 2004; Kim and Kim, 2007; Moon, 2013).  These responses 
can be classified as either verbal, which encompass denial and apology (see for example, Merrington 
et al., 2011; Grover et al., 2014; Liao, 2010) or substantive, which include e-government (e.g. online 
information), transparency and reforms (Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006; Kim and Kim, 2007; 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; and Brillantes and Fernandez, 2011). In contrast to reviews conducted 
in other research areas and disciplines, this list is comparatively narrow. For example, in his review of 
the marketing and management literature Bozic (2017) identified 5 strategies: verbal responses (which 
includes denial, apology and information sharing); organizational restructuring (including reforms); 
penance; hostage posting and use of 3rd parties.  Bachamann’s earlier study within organizational 
studies goes further to identify 6 broad mechanisms which encompass both the aforementioned studies 
(Bachamann et al., 2015). In summary, research within the political trust domain has to-date identified 
a limited range of trust repair responses.  Bachman et al (2015) provide a comprehensive framework, 
and although the transferability of this framework to a non-organizational studies context has been 
questioned (Bozic, 2017) recent empirical research has demonstrated it applicability (see Bolat et al., 
2020).   
 
Trust repair framework 
Bachmann et al. (2015) provide the most comprehensive framework for trust repair integrating six 
mechanisms or responses.  Sense-making draws on the work of Weick (1995) and seeks to identify a 
shared understanding where the violation is expressed in words. The result is an accepted account of 
what happened, who caused the violation  and what needs to be done going forward (Gillespie & Dietz, 
2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008). Public enquiries are an example of sense-making.  The relational approach 
looks to re-establish social order by resolving negative emotions. Symbolic acts such as apologies, 
penance and resetting of expectations fall within this mechanism (Dirks et al., 2009; Stevens et al., 
2015). Regulation and formal control aim to constrain untrustworthy behaviour via the imposition of 
external or internal interventions that clarify what behaviour is acceptable and what is not (Bachmann 
et al., 2015).  Laws, policies and codes of contract are examples of regulation and formal control. 
Ethical culture and informal controls seek to promote ethical values and behaviour, for example, via 
staff induction, professional training or role models (McKendall & Wagner, 1997; Martin, 2011). 
Transparency and accountability concerns the disclosure of relevant information enabling 
stakeholders to monitor the activities of an organization and assess their trustworthiness (Bachmann 
et al., 2015). Examples include corporate reporting and whistleblower protection. Finally,  trust 
transference concerns the transfer of trust from a credible and trusted party to the distrusted party, for 
example via endorsement or affiliation   (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Zucker, 1986).  
 
The Bachmann et al. (2020) framework is based on the proposition that no single trust repair response 
can repair trust. They also caution that such responses are likely to vary by context and over time and 
called for future research to be conducted in different cultures and establish how use of the responses 
vary over time. Bozic (2017) also called for future research to consider the perspective of different 
stakeholders. Our longitudinal study responds to these calls as it seeks to understand which responses 
can repair trust among potential voters in an emerging country, Tunisia,  by examining the viewpoints 
of politicians and citizens over time. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND STUDY CONTEXT 
A multi-method approach was adopted for this study comprising two discrete data sources:  semi-
structured interviews with Tunisian politicians and citizens; and media data from TV political talk 
shows. Data collection centered on six key political events: (1) murder of the political opponent Chokri 
Belaid and  (2) murder of the political opponent Mohamed Brahmi, both in 2013; (3) start of the 
National Dialogue and (4) adoption of the constitution both in 2014; (5) Parliamentary elections and 
(6) Presidential elections in 2015. Together these represent two negative and four positives events in 
which to examine trust repair responses.  
 
Semi-structured interviews. 100 semi-structured interviews were conducted to provide rich and deep 
insight into political trust repair. Interviews were conducted at three time-points:  first interviews with 
38 citizens and 62 politicians were conducted after events (1) and (2); second with 11 citizens and 31 
politicians after events (3) and (4); and third with 20 citizens and 10 politicians after events (5) and 
(6). In each round of interviews, interviewees were asked about both events. Informants were Tunisian 
citizens, as well as politicians belonging to ruling parties and opposition. Full details of the 
interviewees can be found in Appendix A and B.  The final sample size was informed by theoretical 
saturation as recommended by Glaser and Strauss (1967).  Interviews were conducted face-to-face and 
at a time and place convenient to the participants. They lasted approximately 40 minutes on average. 
All tapes were transcribed. 
Media data has the ability to explain current and past events (Tweedale, 2003) as it provides a wide 
range of readily accessible information that can deliver insider insights on a social subject (Franzosi, 
1998). We selected political TV talk shows according to two criteria. First, we identified political 
shows with the highest audience rating in Tunisia namely, Ettounsya, Watanya 1 and Nessma (based 
on Sigma Conseil data); and second, we identified those shows that addressed the issue of political 
trust repair. All episodes from three political shows that ran in the month following each of the six 
events were included in this study.  In total this represented 407 hours of aired programs. Each episode 
was reviewed and all sections that dealt explicitly or implicitly with the issue of trust repair responses 
were transcribed.  
 
A database was constructed containing all transcripts from the study, i.e. from the interviews and TV 
shows (Yin, 2018). A thematic content analysis was conducted to identify political trust repair 
responses. As recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985), the thematic analysis was created by one 
author and then peer reviewed. Transcripts were coded and comparisons made between responses 
given by the interviewed politicians and citizens and against the contributions of those appearing in 
the TV political talk shows. In addition, due to the longitudinal nature of this study, emerging themes 
were compared across the three events to identify similarities and differences emerging in the 
responses. Key themes emerged following a continuous and repeated comparison of the data (Patton, 
2002), An unforeseen finding was the emergence of the citizen’s role in the trust repair process from 
the interviews with politicians, further analysis was undertaken to identify if this also featured in the 
interviews with citizens. 
 
Tunisia was selected as the context for this study as it was the first MENA country to experience the 
Arab Spring movement and change its political environment (Teti et al., 2018). Contrary to the Arab 
countries in which the revolutions took place (Libya, Syria and Egypt); Tunisia qualified as a 
democracy in 2017 following the successful 2014 elections (Teti et al., 2018). However, print media, 
broadcast news and polls have shown a continued low level of trust in all the political parties even 
after the parliament and presidential elections of 2014. Indeed, participation in the 2018 local elections 
was only 33.7%, against 68.36% during the 2014 elections.  
 
FINDINGS 
Data analysis was two-part, first we identified if, and when, there was a need to repair trust; and second 
what responses were suggested to repair trust. Responses were categorized by time, guided by the 
typology of Lewicki and Brinsfield (2017), and according to the 6 Bachmann et al. (2015) trust repair 
mechanisms. We will begin by examining the perceived need to repair trust. 
 
The need to repair trust 
Political stakeholders and citizens agreed that there was a need to repair trust in the government and 
political parties, however, the strength of this need changed over time. In the interviews, trust repair 
was most frequently mentioned after the election in 2015. This was surprising given that trust was 
severely violated in 2013 with the murder of the two Tunisian opponents (Chokri Belaid and Mohamed 
Brahmi) and also several terrorist attacks causing the death of the Tunisian security forces. Following 
these dramatic events, both citizens and politicians agreed that it would be difficult, but not impossible, 
for political parties (whether ruling or not) to repair trust. Additionally, after the adoption of the 
constitution and the parliament and presidential elections of 2014, two theoretically optimistic events, 
talk shows participants (especially government representatives), stressed the need to repair trust 
towards political parties and government. This signals an awareness of an on-going political distrust. 
Notably, even the President of the Tunisian Republic expressed concern about political distrust and 
expressed the need for the government and the presidency institutions to act in a way that would restore 
trust in a speech in 2015:   
“we need to win trust. We need to trust in our capabilities and in the future of our country” 
(President of the Tunisian Republic). 
 
Swift trust repair 
When discussing trust repair, TV political talk show contributors identified the need for swift trust 
repair. This call was particularly observed after the assassination of political opponents. Under these 
circumstances, politicians were deemed not to have the luxury of time to repair trust due to a ‘trust 
crisis’. Trust needed to be repaired quickly to resolve political uncertainty and to reach agreement on 
the adoption of the constitution and the holding of national elections. In order to do this, there was a 
need for dialogue, for parties to communicate with each other to make sense of what had happened 
and what needed to be done. This call for swift trust led to the National Dialogue that provided a way 
out of the political impasse between the government of Ennahdha and the opposition.  
 
Swift trust has been identified previously and is defined as a form of trust occurring in temporary 
organizations in which “actors deal with one another more as roles than as individuals. Expectations, 
consequently, are more standardized and stable and defined more in terms of tasks than as 
personalities” (Grabher, 2002:210). Accordingly, the objective of swift trust, which is based mainly 
on roles, is to reach high levels of trust without having a prior relationship or experience (Meyerson et 
al., 1996).  
 
Short-Term Responses 
Three categories of short-term responses were identified relating to 1- political parties; 2- political 
institutions; and 3- citizens. 
 
Political parties. The majority of interviewees (citizens and politicians) identified ‘having a realistic 
political program’ as an important way in which to repair trust as the absence of concrete political 
programs was perceived as symptomatic of political parties’ incompetence. This trust repair response 
was shaped by past experience and the failure of Ennahdha political program’s 365 points presented 
before the 2011 elections and highlights a need for political parties to be accountable, setting and 
delivering on realistic targets.  
 
Other short-term responses were identified across all data collection periods (i.e., 2013, 2014 and 
2015) and align with a need for informal control to constrain untrustworthy behaviour. Specifically, 
all interviewees called for the different parties to cease quarreling and identify areas of agreement. 
Interviewees called on the political parties to recognize that citizens had voted for parties on all sides 
of the political spectrum and they needed to work together (even at the cost of sacrificing party views) 
to find solutions to the current political and economic crisis in the country. This suggestion reflects the 
Tunisian culture whereby ethnic and religious minorities and social groups work together to create a 
communication point and practice the art of negotiation (Rouissi, 1987).  Additionally, Ouannes (2010) 
noted that Tunisians rapidly integrate and adapt and make concessions only if it helps them to achieve 
professional, material and social gains. 
 
Apologies were suggested by a high number of interviewed politicians especially following the 
political murders in 2013 and the adoption of the constitution in 2014. Politicians called for the 
government and political parties to acknowledge their failure and take responsibility in order to 
successfully repair trust. In contrast, very few interviewed citizens mentioned an apology, highlighting 
a disparity between politicians and citizens, the latter under-estimating the level of political distrust 
among citizens towards the government and political parties. Quite simply, an apology, which is a 
symbolic act (Bachmann et al., 2015) was insufficient to restore trust with citizens when the magnitude 
of the trust violation was so large and resulted in high emotional reactions. Indeed, Farrell and Rabin 
(1996) have criticized apologies, describing them as a form of “cheap talk”. Interviewed politicians 
also called for explanations to help to repair trust. Political party leaders had blamed their failure on 
others, a poor form of trust transference (Bachmann et al.,2015) instead of acknowledging their 
mistakes. Interviewees were however seeking an understanding of the trust violation, a shared 
understanding, or as Bachmann et al., (2015) would label this – sensemaking. Prior studies have found 
that explanations after a violation play a crucial role in repairing trust (Shapiro, 1991) and the more 
detailed they are, the more effective (Shapiro et al., 1994). Culture can influence the effectiveness of 
explanations which are more effective in collectivist cultures than individualistic ones (Ren and Gray, 
2009; Maddux et al., 2011) which would reinforce their importance in Tunisia. 
 
Political institutions. Short-term trust repair responses related to political institutions were the most 
frequently mentioned. In the period between the murder of Chokri Belaid and the adoption of the 
constitution in 2014, interviewed politicians agreed that holding elections and adopting the 
constitution were the way out from the Tunisian political trust crisis. Interviewees called for political 
leaders to end the transition period by holding parliamentary and presidential elections that would put 
in place a government with a longer-term mandate to guarantee political stability and better political 
and economic visibility. Findings from the media data supported this viewpoint. Indeed, after the 
murders of Chokri Belaid and especially Mohamed Brahmi, the recurrence of these two repair trust 
responses, especially among politicians which aim to put in place formal control, was witnessed.  
 
Other respondents, especially from the TV show participants, suggested more radical but peaceful 
responses, namely the creation of a technocratic government and  the resignation of the government 
dominated by Ennahdha and the dissolution of the National Assembly, to repair political trust among 
citizens. Using Bachmann et al.’s (2015) framework, all fall within the relational approach as the 
suggestions result in a redistribution of power and resetting of expectations; these symbolic acts serve 
to  resolve negative emotions caused by the violations (in this case the two political murders in 2013).  
 
Two further means with which to repair trust in political institutions were mentioned by a minority of 
interviewees. First citizens called for the benefits and the salaries of ministers to be reduced: 
“at this time of crisis, it is not normal to see so many ministers, not to mention their salaries. 
It is therefore mandatory to revise the benefits and salaries of the current ministers.” (Female, 
2013, interview) 
This can be viewed as a form of penance in order to re-establish social order (Bachmann et al, 2015). 
Indeed, after his appointment in 2016, the head of government reduced minsters’ remuneration by 
10%. Results of a Sigma Conseil poll two months later confirmed the effectiveness of this response as 
the performance of the government, for its first 100 days, was estimated as positive by 45.8% of 
Tunisians. The second trust repair response to be mentioned by a few study participants, in this case 
interviewed politicians, identified the need for the involvement of an external third party. The 
suggestion was that a third party can resolve conflict and mediate the process of trust repair. Third 
parties are viewed as a form of trust transference by Bachmann et al (2015). Prior studies have 
highlighted the importance of third party mediation in the trust repair process (Tomlinson and Mryer, 
2009; Yu et al., 2015), however its influence of on trust repair is still under-studied (Klein Woolthuis 
et al., 2014).  
 
Citizens. The role of citizens in the trust repair process was identified as a short-term response. This is 
a novel suggestion as the focus is on trustor actions, i.e. the person who trusts another person or entity, 
rather than the trustee as the person or entity being trusted.  Civic engagement by citizens (the trustors) 
was identified by the interviewed citizens and politicians and TV political talk shows participants. 
Respondents called for citizens to bury their differences and unite to smooth the trust repair process 
and hold politicians accountable:    
 
“The President of the Republic had previously all the powers and consequently we were not 
able to question him. It is important to admit today that thanks to the struggles of the 
democratic forces, the accountability of the President of the Republic is henceforth recognized 
in the 2014 constitution. People have the power now to sanction also political parties during 
elections.” (Female, 2014, media data). 
 
This statement demonstrates the empowerment of citizens to exercise their civic duty and hold 
politicians accountable.  
 
Long-Term Responses 
Long-term trust repair responses have received less attention in the literature (Lewicki and Brinsfield 
2017), however this study identified a range of responses suggested for longer term trust repair.   
 
Political parties and government. Almost all interviewed politicians across the three events 
highlighted the failure of political parties and government to communicate with citizens. They 
suggested that communication can improve politicians’ image and restore trust. A high number of 
interviewed citizens and a few TV political talk contributors echoed this view.  All noted that 
politicians should know how to manage a crisis that requires good communication skills.  Transparent 
communication was required to reassures voters in a situation of increased political uncertainty and 
anxiety: 
 
“The opposition parties must keep a clear and unambiguous speech that draws a clear 
guideline. Their speeches must be immutable.” (Male,  2013, interview). 
 
 Moreover, citizens called for direct forms of communication between the political parties and citizens, 
favoring direct personal contact:  
 
Communication through periodic meetings and door-to-door canvassing will allow closer 
relationships with citizens. I believe that personal contacts are effective means to repair trust 
(Male, 2015,  interview). 
This direct contact is characteristic of the Tunisian culture, where people like to maintain social contact 
and derive pleasure in multiple social interactions (Skandrani et al., 2011). However, according to 
Boursin (1999:9), communication is not always the best strategy to restore trust after a violation, as 
this requires deep reaching and tangible change.  
 
There was a common agreement across all data sources that in order to repair political trust in political 
parties and government the political parties needed to fulfil their electoral promises, especially after 
the parliament and presidential elections:   
 
When we announce projects, we have to be able to realize it. This is one aspect of the trust 
between the government and officials and the people. This allows restoring trust between 
government and citizens. (Male, 2013, media data).  
 
Extant studies have generally assumed that there is a correlation between fulfilling electoral promises 
and electorates’ behavior. For instance, Pétry (2014) suggests that keeping campaign promises is a 
fundamental component of democratic responsiveness. Nevertheless, empirical studies regarding this 
relationship are lacking. This response has been classified as ethical culture and informal control 
(Bachmann et al., 2015 framework) as there are no formal rules or controls to ensure parties deliver 
on their promises, it is an ethical choice to deliver on the promises made.  
 
Government. six trust repair responses were identified from the data analysis related to government, 
namely: economic responses, regulation, fight against corruption, ensuring security, respect for 
freedom and fairness. 
 
Economic response - this trust repair response stems from the Tunisia’s fragile economic situation and 
economic crisis. Interviewed politicians and citizens and TV talk shows contributors cited several 
issues underpinning the call for improvement in the economy in order to restore trust: the significant 
drop in Tunisian people’s purchasing power since the revolution; an increase in unemployment rate; 
rising regional and social inequalities; and disparities between the coastal areas and those in land.  The 
need to improve the economy was therefore viewed as a priority.  Prior studies identified the influence 
of the economic situation on levels of political trust. Indeed, past studies have found that economic 
performance in itself can explain a fall in political trust (Hetherington, 1998), however no previous 
studies have identified the relationship between economic reform and trust repair. Prima facie this 
response is difficult to classify within the Bachman et al. (2015) framework. Discussions within the 
group and repeated cross-referencing between the data and framework resulted in this response being 
classified as trust transference. Although the economy is not a third party as such, a positive turn in 
the economy would be used as an example of the trust repair undertaken by the political party: a form 
of reputation spillover (Bachman et al., 2015). 
 
The majority of interviewed politicians and citizens suggested that regulation of party funding could 
repair citizens’ distrust of political parties and government, particularly after the political murders and 
2014 elections; and to a lesser extent after the adoption of the constitution. Contributors to the TV 
political talk shows, especially politicians, cited a lack of public control over political parties’ funding 
and the need for public authorities to implement a strict law regulating how political parties operate 
(regulation and formal control). Regulations are required to prevent donations from illegal sources as 
the sources of almost all the existing legal political parties remain largely unknown. Moreover, the 
victory of Ennahdha in the 2011 elections is closely connected to its suspicious financial funds. 
Previous studies have also argued that regulation could be effective in repairing trust (Dirks et al., 
2011; Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Eberl et al., 2015). Indeed, they consider that the presence of strict 
laws in response to an integrity-based violation sends a clear signal that the behavior is unacceptable 
and thus will be avoided in the future. 
 
Fighting against corruption was reported by interviewed citizens and politicians, especially after the 
political murders and the 2014 elections. According to respondents, the government had been 
weakened by political instability enabling the spread of corruption and clientelism was threatening the 
democratic transition in Tunisia. Previous studies have identified that fighting corruption is perceived 
as an important measure of political performance (Lambsdorff, 2007) and that citizens support 
institutions that are reducing corruption (Sidani et al., 2009), while other studies report that corruption 
has a low impact on trust in government in transition countries because people demand more basic 
services (Uslaner, 2014). Our results offer more support to the former.   
 
Security was also identified as a means to repair trust. Respondents called for a national counter-
terrorism strategy and were willing to sacrifice freedom for greater security: 
 
Government should ensure security and fight against terrorism. For me, security is more 
important and fundamental than freedom (Female, 2013, interview).  
 
Authors have previously identified security as a reason for citizens’ cynicism (Chanley et al., 2000). 
Indeed, Chanley (2002) reported that trust in a government could increase when the government 
defends national security, particularly in developing countries (Espinal et al, 2006). Security is 
particularly important in Tunisia as the terrorist attacks have led to a significant decline in the tourism 
sector considered as the economic engine of the Tunisian economy.  This response was categorized as 
trust transference in line with economic response (above). 
 
Political parties. Many interviewed politicians and citizens (after all events) identified political 
experience as required to enable political parties to repair trust. Two contributors in TV political talk 
shows also mentioned this response. Experienced politicians are perceived to be more competent and 
trustworthy. It is interesting to note that the lack of political experience as an antecedent of political 
distrust could be specific to the Tunisian context as it is a new democracy. Indeed, most politicians in 
Tunisia had no experience with politics at the time of the study.  A rule requiring that a proportion of 
politicians within any one party had to have political experience would be categorized as regulation 
and formal control within the trust repair framework.  
Eight interviewed citizens and six politicians identified patriotism as a means to repair trust after the 
adoption of the constitution and 2014 elections. They called for politicians to be altruistic. Previous 
studies have examined the relationship between civic patriotism and political trust and involvement 
(Hetherington and Rudolph, 2008; Straughn and Andriot, 2011), however the impact of politicians’ 
patriotism on political trust was not identified in previous studies. This has been classified as a cultural 
change that would constrain untrustworthy behaviour and hence placed under ethical culture and 
informal control in the Bachmann et al (2015) framework. The following schema (Table 1) summarizes 
our study main findings.  
 





Response to: Mechanisms identified in the 
study 









Realistic political program Transparency and accountability  
Abandoning quarrels and 
agreements between political 
parties 
Ethical culture and informal control 




Holding elections and adoption 
of the constitution 
Regulation and formal control 
Technocratic Government/ 
Resignation of Government/ 
Dissolvement of National 
Assembly 
Regulation and formal control 
Revising ministers’ salaries Relational approach 
Involvement of a third party Trust transference 
Long-term Both political 
parties and 
government 
Transparent communication Transparency and accountability 
Keeping electoral promises Ethical culture and informal control 
Government Economic responses Trust transference 
Regulation Regulation and formal control 
fight against corruption Ethical culture and informal control 
ensuring security Trust transference 
Political 
parties 
Political experience  Ethical culture and informal control 
Patriotism Ethical culture and informal control 
An analysis across the different events (see Table 1) identifies not one, but a variety of trust repair 
responses. Also noticeable is an evolving pattern with the move from negative to more positive events. 
Following the 2013 assassinations, respondents were immediately seeking sense-making activities in 
order to understand what had happened. This was followed by a call for more regulation and control 
responses that would formally constrain untrustworthy behaviour and prevent future trust violations. 
Following the 2014 dialogue and constitution, respondents called for more symbolic and relational 
responses. Finally, in 2015 and post elections, respondents sought ethical responses and informal 
control. Although this change in trust repair responses might suggest a potential repair of trust, it is 
notable that regulation continues to be mentioned across the different events reinforcing a continued 
presence of distrust.  
    
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to identify the responses required to repair political trust in Tunisia and the 
differences between two key stakeholder groups: politicians and voters.  This study is among a very 
few to identify an array of trust repair responses in the political domain. Past studies have tended to 
focus on single specific responses (for example, Kim and Kim, 2007; Moon, 2013). Our analysis 
identified that political actors and citizens were aware of the need to repair trust in government and 
political parties and identified a wide array of responses to repair lost trust.  
 
The study makes five contributions to trust repair theory. First, this study has identified multiple trust 
repair responses beyond those identified in previous studies. For example, although the economic 
situation has been identified previously, it has been associated with a drop in political trust rather than 
a repair response (Hetherington, 1998).  Previous studies have examined patriotism from a civic 
perspective (Straughn and Andriot, 2011) but the link between a politicians’ patriotism and trust has 
not been previously established. Our study therefore suggested that political trust repair responses are 
potentially more numerous than previously stated and that multiple responses may be required to repair 
trust (Bachmann et al, 2015). 
 
Second, we identified a new timescale within the trust repair calendar, i.e. swift trust repair. In this 
study, swift trust repair was required to deal with political uncertainty after a major trust violation: the 
assassination of the two political leaders. Lewicki and Brinsfield (2017) had previously identified short 
and long terms responses, however our respondents suggested that swift trust could provide a basic 
level of trust to enable an organization to move forward, in this case for the adoption of the constitution 
and holding of national elections. 
 
Third, differences in responses were identified by stakeholder, namely politicians and voters. Previous 
studies have ignored the needs of different stakeholders (Bachman et al., 2015). This distinction is 
particularly important in this study as the differences were identified between the trustee and trustor 
which could result in a trust repair mis-match or gap that would hinder trust repair by the trustee.  
 
Fourth, previous studies have focused mainly on the courses of action that the trustee undertakes to 
repair trust, under the assumption that the trustor is a passive observer. Contrary to these studies, our 
research has revealed that citizens can also be actively involved in the trust repair process, making it a 
dynamic and bilateral process. Indeed, our respondents suggest that civic engagement and 
accountability will lead to a more participative exercise of power. In this regard, citizens will be able 
to influence government priorities and ensure that their demands are met. 
 
Finally, this study has demonstrated the applicability of Bachmann’s trust repair framework. As this 
framework was developed in an organizational studies context, its applicability to other contexts had 
been questioned (Bozic, 2017) and only one study had established its use in a marketing context (see 
Bolat et al., 2020). The findings from this study establish the use of this integrative framework in a 
new context, political trust, and highlights how the use of the 6 mechanisms can help to identify 
patterns in the process of trust repair, i.e. how the different responses and mechanisms change over 
time as trust is slowly repaired.  
 
Managerial contributions  
Findings from our study provide Tunisian politicians with an insight into how to repair voter trust 
particularly following an extreme violation of trust. This study has identified a wide array of potential 
trust repair responses from which politicians can choose. For example, communication has been found 
to be important in terms of helping citizens to initially make sense of what has happened when things 
go wrong; and, also, in terms of transparency and building relationships with voters.  Given the array 
of responses identified in this study it is important that political organizations consider using multiple 
responses to repair trust (Bachmann et al., 2015), not only over time but at any one specific point in 
time.  Selection of the appropriate responses can be informed by the findings from this study. Caution 
is however recommended when politicians devise a trust repair response strategy as this study has 
highlighted clear differences between the responses suggested by politicians and those suggested by 
voters.  
 
Limitations and future research 
This study, as with any study, has its limitations. It focused on one MENA country, Tunisian. Other 
studies may address the differences between Tunisia and other Arab countries that have also 
experienced revolution (i.e. Egypt, etc.) and the responses required to repair trust in the political 
domain.  Tunisian citizens were interviewed after the key events in 2013, 2014 and 2015, however the 
citizens varied in each round of interviews. Some differences in the responses identified could 
therefore be due to the change in interviewee rather than the events. We would recommend that future 
studies repeatedly interview the same interviewees as a form of interviewee panel.  Finally, and 
following the recommendation of Bachmann et al. (2015) our research adopted a longitudinal study to 
identify suggested trust repair responses following selected key events. We did not examine in any 
depth whether these responses were adopted by political parties and the government or indeed, when 
they were adopted, were they successful in restoring trust. It is recommended that future studies adopt 
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